INTRODUCTION
This article provides a brief overview of the current state of anti-terrorism litigation under US federal law for the adjudication of international torts such as terrorism and other serious human rights violations. Corporate terrorism litigation focuses on the role and impact of both corporate and individual financial aiders and abettors of international terrorism and explores the desirability and feasibility of subjecting these non-state actors to transnational human rights litigation.
The threat of international terrorism represents one of the most severe "hybrid threats" which NATO attempts to counter: hybrid threats are those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives (see https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/ACTIPT/JOUIPT/2010201 1CH/Experiment/PlanningCo/CHTExperim. The author took part in this experiment in May 2011 as NATO Rule of Law SME participant). Combating terrorism requires a holistic approach which combines hard kinetic security operations with the options of criminal prosecution and civil reparations through litigation.
So called "bankrupting terrorism" lawsuits (cf Shurat HaDin Israel Law Center which uses this term to refer to USIsraeli terrorism litigation, see http://www.israellawcenter.org) refer to civil litigation which is directed against "funding" activities (eg direct payments to terrorist groups) and other forms of aiding and abetting (such as the provision of material support) qualifying as "indirect" or secondary liability of the corporate actors. Much in this area focuses on responsibility and liability of corporations such as banks (see the case Arab Bank I, 384 F.Supp. 2d 580), NGOs and religious charity organisations within their respective litigation context (cf the case of Boim v Quranic Literacy Inst, 291 F.3d 1000, 1001 -1003 (7th Cir.2002 , also referred to as Boim I). Such "indirect liability" litigation should not be confused with litigation which is directed against the terrorist group itself such as al Qaeda or Hamas (See Boim litigation cases consisting of the cases Boim I, Boim v Holy Land Found. for Relief Dev, Nos. 05-1815 ,05-1816 ,05-1821 ,05-1822 (7th Cir. 2007 and Boim III 549 F.3d 685, 687 97th cir.2008 ). This short article aims to provide a brief overview of the potential role US styled terrorism litigation can play in countering threats of terrorism as one of the more serious hybrid threats.
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Corporate accountability for aiding and abetting acts of international terrorism is based on the (evolving) notion of civil corporate responsibility for basically a tort (delict) which qualifies as both an international crime as well as a "gross" human rights violation. 
US HUMAN RIGHTS AND TERRORISM TORT LITIGATION
US human rights litigation against the individual and corporate defendant, as perpetrator or aider and abettor of human rights violations as well as international terrorism has developed as a notion of accountability over the last 30 years.
Such litigation, which became otherwise known as transnational litigation, began with seminal case of Filartiga v Pena-Irala (630 F.2d 876) in 1980, which concerned acts of (state sponsored) torture which were committed outside the territory of the USA with non-US citizens as both victim and perpetrator. The court established US federal jurisdiction in this extraterritorial case by utilizing a statute from 1789 which had been dormant for nearly 220 years, the so called Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA, now being referred to as the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)).
This piece of legislation confers subject matter jurisdiction to a US federal court when: (1) an alien plaintiff sues, (2) for tort only (3) based on an act that was committed in violation of either the law of nations or a treaty of the US. The range of possible torts (arising "of mutual, and not merely several, concern, by means of express in international accords, that a wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation within the meaning of the (ATCA) statute" (Filartiga at 888)) as case law arising from such international law violations developed over the last 30 years certain norms and criteria whose breaches qualify as violations of the law of nations and are therefore actionable as ATS/ATCA torts.
Lawsuits against corporate and state sponsors of terrorism can be brought under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS/ATCA -28 USC Section 1350), the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA-28 USC Section 1350), the AntiTerrorism Act (ATA-18 USC Sections 2331-2338) as an amendment to the above ATS, the "State Sponsors of Terrorism" exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA Exception-28 USC section 1605 (a) (7), which allows lawsuit against so called state sponsors of terrorism), and finally the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).
In order to determine whether a violation of international human rights and international humanitarian law may qualify as an actionable violation of the law of nations as required under the ATS, the so called "law of nation" test was developed in the case Forti v. Suarez-Mason (672 F Supp 1531 (ND Cal 1987 ) whereas any violation had to be "universal, definable and obligatory" (The so called Forti test consists actually of two parts, Forti I and II with the former outlining the requirements for the jus cogens nature of actionable torts and the latter defining the "universality" criteria thereof). Generally speaking, the following human rights violations can establish US federal jurisdiction under the ATS: torture, summary execution or extrajudicial killing, genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, disappearances, arbitrary detention and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as international terrorism and hostage-taking (B Stephens 63 -92). The TVPA grants jurisdiction for legal actions brought by US citizens for acts of (state) torture and/or extra-judicial killings. Section 2 (a) TVPA states that:
"an individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation (1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action be liable for damages to that individual; or (2) subjects an individual to extra-judicial killing, shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to the individual's legal representative, or any person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death".
The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1994 makes provisions for civil lawsuits for injuries and losses sustained through an act of international terrorism which would otherwise not pass the above 
CORPORATE TERRORISM LAWSUITS
The wider, non terrorist -related, litigation of corporate collusion in violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law has seen cases for corporate collusion in the commission of crimes against humanity, war crimes, widespread torture: the case of Corporate aiding and abetting liability breaks with the stricter liability standard of the Kadic v Karadzic (70 F3d 232 (2d Cir 1995) ) rule, whereas the corporate defendant had to exercise some form of control over state perpetrators' actions (cf Symposium on "Corporate liability for violations of international human rights law" in 114 Harvard Law Review (2001) , 2039) The judgment in the above discussed Wiwa case clarifies that corporate "aiding and abetting" takes place simply by financing and supporting knowingly state sponsored human rights violations. It does therefore not follow the stricter "overall control" test of Tadic (Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, Judgment Appeals Chamber (ICTY), 38 ILM 1518 , 1549 and the "effective control" test of Nicaragua (Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, ICJ Rep 1986, 62 et seq) .
The 2010 case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum (No. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv, 2010 WL 3611392 (2d Cir. Sept. 17, 2010 ) concerns the question whether the ATS can be applied to aiding and abetting activities of corporations: to what extent this case will limit or even exclude such torts/delict action against the corporate colluder in human rights violations and acts of terrorism will have to be seen.
CONCLUSION
Human rights litigation in the USA has altered existing perceptions of the role of corporations in the commission of human rights atrocities: the assertion that only states (and non -state actors of a Kadic nature) could commit such crimes has been changed through the emergence of the new notion of civil corporate accountability: the two Holocaust lawsuits as well as the ongoing Apartheid litigation are examples hereof. The key principles of corporate complicity in gross human rights violations do also apply in cases of liability for aiding and abetting in acts of international terrorism. US transnational litigation acknowledges the new standing of the victim of such human rights abuses as well as terrorism as an individual claims holder (as evident for example under the European Convention of Human rights, see eg the individual application procedure under Art 34 of the ECHR) acknowledging his/her own right ius standi. Traditional concepts of interstate reparations for breaches of international law are supplemented by a new, hybrid form of liability which combines elements of private civil tort litigation with elements of international law.
In Europe, the absence of such human rights/terrorism litigation is an unfortunate fact; nevertheless, the dicta of The use of US human rights litigation as an additional means of fighting international terrorism globally as part of a wider anti -terrorism strategy has its limitations if not developed further into an internationally recognised institute of granting legal and remedial redress to victims of terrorism and gross human rights abuses.
• The topic has been presented to audiences at the universities of Stellenbosch and Cape Town, South Africa and the IALS, and draws from findings of an ongoing UK-Israeli research collaboration with colleagues from Hebrew University (HUJI), Jerusalem. 
